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STEMMING THE EXPANSION OF THE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS
DOCTRINE UNDER JOHNSON
Clancey Henderson*
INTRODUCTION
To the average layperson, the phrases felony “crime of violence” and “violent
felony” may be sufficiently axiomatic to enable proper application of the
classification to certain crimes.1 However, for some jurists and legal scholars, the
phrase’s definition and its subsequent applications remain elusive. The Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Johnson v. United States2 is a prime example of the
ongoing struggle to pin down the application of the phrase “violent felony” as
defined by Congress in the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA).3 In
Johnson, the Court invalidated a portion of the statutory definition of “violent
felony”—known as the “residual clause”—because it was too vague.4 Despite the
Court’s explicit effort to preserve the legitimacy of other statutes defining the phrase
or other equivalent phrases, 5 the Johnson decision opened a floodgate of litigation
challenging the constitutionality of those very statutes it sought to excuse.
Criminal litigators were quick to use the decision to justify collateral attacks on
sentences imposed under seemingly similar provisions. Several statutory definitions
were called into question under an extension of the Johnson reasoning, including
those given in (1) the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which incorporates
18 U.S.C. § 16(b),6 (2) the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the “Sentencing
*
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1
Justice Thomas opined the residual clause allowed “any fool [to] know that a
particular category of conduct would be within the reach of the statute,” and was thus “not
unconstitutional on its face.” Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2015)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 112 (1999)).
2
135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
3
Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2185 (1984)
(originally codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1202 (1984), now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2012)).
4
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.
5
Id. at 2563, 2561 (noting that “[t]oday’s decision does not call into question
application of the Act to the four enumerated offenses, or the remainder of the Act’s
definition of a violent felony” and rebuffing the assertions of “[t]he Government and the
dissent . . . that dozens of federal and state criminal laws use terms like ‘substantial risk,’
‘grave risk,’ and ‘unreasonable risk,’ suggesting that to hold the residual clause
unconstitutional is to place these provisions in constitutional doubt.” (citations omitted)).
6
See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
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Guidelines”),7 and (3) 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)’s risk-of-force clause.8 The results
of these challenges have been mixed and have caused multiple circuit splits.9
Because of the interrelated nature of the challenges and their bearing on the precious
rights guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Supreme
Court must eventually confront each attempted extension of Johnson.10 The
Supreme Court has already considered and upheld the constitutionality of the
Sentencing Guidelines’ definition in Beckles v. United States.11 But 18 U.S.C.
§ 16(b) was recently overturned by the Supreme Court in Sessions v. Dimaya.12 It
seems only a matter of time before the Supreme Court will similarly need to
determine the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)’s risk-of-force clause.
This Note addresses the constitutionality of the risk-of-force clause. Since
many of the cases challenging the risk-of-force clause proceed on the argument that
it is indistinguishable from the ACCA’s residual clause, the history of the residual
clause is particularly relevant. Addressing the constitutionality of the risk-of-force
clause will necessarily entail a discussion of whether it is distinguishable from the
residual clause. Accordingly, brief histories of the ACCA and the residual clause
will be given. This overview will provide a backdrop to the discussion of the
Supreme Court’s struggle to define and apply the residual clause in numerous cases
preceding the decision in Johnson. Understanding the Court’s trouble addressing the
residual clause is a key component of the comparative analysis that will follow. After
addressing Johnson as the culmination of the Court’s dealings with the residual
clause, this Note will address how Johnson serves as a vehicle for challenges to other
statues under the void-for-vagueness doctrine. The challenges to Johnson are
presented to establish the certainty of a constitutional challenge coming before the
Supreme Court concerning the risk-of-force clause. Last, this Note will address the
constitutionality of the risk-of-force clause under a comparative analysis framework.
The analysis will ultimately show that § 924(c)(3)(B) is distinguishable from
previously invalidated statutory definitions and should be upheld as constitutional.

7

See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
9
See infra Part I.C.
10
See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556 (“The Fifth Amendment provides that ‘[n]o person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’ Our cases
establish that the Government violates this guarantee by taking away someone’s life, liberty,
or property under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of
the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.” (citing
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983)).
11
137 S. Ct. 886 (2017).
12
138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
8
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I. BACKGROUND
A. History of the ACCA
The ACCA was enacted during a period in which national legislators sought to
enhance penalties in order to stem growing crime rates, and in particular, to deter
repeat offenders.13 The original bill, the Career Criminal Life Sentence Act of 1981,
proposed a life sentence for repeat felony offenders.14 But, Congress passed the bill
only after it was revised to include a more lenient sentencing range of “fifteen-years
to life.”15 That bill, however, was vetoed by President Reagan because of federalism
concerns—he felt that the bill encroached on the states’ enforcement of the
traditionally local crimes of armed burglary and armed robbery.16 The mandatory
sentence enhancements were later modified to apply only to offenders found in
violation of a federal firearm statute that prohibits felons from possessing firearms.17
This enabled the bill to overcome the federalism reservations and secured the
ACCA’s passage.18 Soon after, the ACCA’s scope was broadened considerably by
the inclusion of the residual clause, which enumerated certain crimes and implicated

13
See Sen. Arlen Specter, R-Pa., Thursday introduced two bills that. . . , UPI (Oct. 1,
1981),
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1981/10/01/Sen-Arlen-Specter-R-Pa-Thursdayintroduced-two-bills-that/1351370756800/ [https://perma.cc/6YEY-5BL9] (quoting Senator
Specter, indicating the bill punished “habitual offenders” because “about two-thirds of
robberies and burglaries are committed by career criminals”); see also S. REP. NO. 98-190,
at 3, 6 (1983) (noting robbery and burglary, crimes addressed by the bill, “are more prevalent
and have increased faster than any other type of violent crime”); James G. Levine, The Armed
Career Criminal Act and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 546–48 (2009) (detailing the ACCA’s legislative history); see, e.g.,
Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain
the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 165 (2004),
http://pricetheory.uchicago.edu/levitt/Papers/LevittUnderstandingWhyCrime2004.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F45X-9J83] (confirming that statistics reflect that the “same pattern
observed for homicide is present for every major crime” and observing that murder rates
doubled over a 15-year period, “rising to a peak . . . in 1980”).
14
S. 1688, 97th Cong. § 2 (1981).
15
S. 52, 98th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 1983) (enacted).
16
Id. § 3 (noting President Reagan would not sign the bill because of his “concern about
the jurisdictional nature of the local prosecutor’s ‘veto’ power over Federal prosecutions
contained in the career criminal portion of the bill.”); see also Constitutionality of Federal
Habitual Offender Legislation, 344 Op. Att’y Gen, Crim. Div. (1981) (“[W]e would observe
that the bill might be read to impose its substantive requirements on the states in the course
of their conduct of state prosecution.”).
17
Levine, supra note 13, at 546–47 (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-1073 (1984)).
18
Id.
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other similar crimes.19 This served to incapacitate a greater swath of career criminals,
beyond burglars and robbers, and reoriented the ACCA to its original intentions.20
The ACCA, as referenced for the remainder of this Note, is best understood as
a federal law establishing a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentencing
enhancement for the unlawful possession of a firearm by repeat offenders with at
least three prior convictions for either violent or drug felonies. The ACCA, as
codified, reads in relevant part:
(1) In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title [as a
felon in possession of a firearm] and has three previous convictions . . . for
a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, . . . such person shall be
fined under this title and imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and,
notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the
sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such person . . . .
(2) As used in this subsection—
....
(B) the term “violent felony” means any crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that—
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another . . . . 21
Section 924(e)(2)(B)(i) is known as the “elements clause.” The latter half of
924(e)(2)(B)(ii)—which defines “violent felony” as a felony that “otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another,”—is the residual clause which was invalidated by the Supreme Court in
Johnson.22
Prior to the invalidation of the ACCA’s residual clause, an estimated 600
sentences were enhanced by the statute each year.23 Despite the relatively limited

19

H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 6 (1986); see also Levine, supra note 13, at 547.
Levine, supra note 13.
21
18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).
22
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556–58 (2015).
23
Caroline Grueskin, 13 Words That Could Mean Freedom for Many: The Debate over
the Federal Residual Clause,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 19, 2015),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/10/19/13-words-that-could-mean-freedom-formany#.QPbesy5jR [https://perma.cc/L7DL-GBZG].
20
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application of the statutory enhancement,24 many costly appeals resulted25 because
of the statute’s considerable penalty—a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence
imposed in addition to the underlying crime’s sentence.26 Even measured against the
subgroup of offenders that get to trial at almost twice the average rate for federal
criminal defendants (those subject to mandatory minimum sentences), offenders
sentenced under the ACCA were almost three times more likely to get an appeal.27
The above average appeal rate was initially spurred by the broad and inexact
language employed by the statute. The primary issue concerned the ambiguity
stemming from the definitions for predicate offenses—those which qualified the
felons’ past conduct to justify the imposition of the statutory enhancement. Even
greater confusion and uncertainty resulted from a series of Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the statutory language and its application in conflicting ways.28 The
Court’s struggle to give form to the statutory definitions was key to the ultimate
decision to invalidate the residual clause.29 These opinions are addressed below
briefly for context.
B. The Court’s Struggle to Apply the ACCA’s Residual Clause
Prior to the decision in Johnson, the Court considered the ACCA’s residual
clause four times in five years. First, in James v. United States, the Court determined
the residual clause covers attempted burglary, as defined by Florida state law.30 Less
24
Avi M. Kupfer, Note, A Comprehensive Administrative Solution to the Armed Career
Criminal Act Debacle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 151, 152 n.2 (2014) (citing U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM,
282–84 (2011) and concluding that “approximately 3 percent of federal inmates, qualify for
the sentencing enhancement.”).
25
156 CONG. REC. S10,516 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter)
(expressing disappointment over the “costly and time-consuming [ACCA] litigation at every
level of the Federal court system . . . .”).
26
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (“[N]otwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall
not suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such person with respect to
the conviction . . . .”); see also id. § 924(c)(1)(D) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of
law–(i) a court shall not place on probation any person convicted of a violation of this
subsection; and (ii) no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall
run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any
term of imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during
which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed.”).
27
In 2010, 17.4 percent of the defendants sentenced under the ACCA went to trial. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 284 (2011).
28
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 228 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This indeed
leaves the lower courts and those subject to this law to sail upon a virtual sea of doubt.”),
overruled by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
29
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560 (2015).
30
See James, 550 U.S at 195.
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than one year later, the clause came before the Court again in Begay v. United
States.31 This time the Court considered and rejected the applicability of the statute
to the offense of driving under the influence under New Mexico law.32 Not ten
months later, the Court again considered the clause in Chambers v. United States
and determined that it does not cover the offense of failing to report to a penal
institution under Illinois state law.33 The Court then had a small reprieve from the
clause and did not address it again for eighteen months until Sykes v. United States,
at which point it again declined to find that the statute encompassed the offense in
question, vehicular flight from a law-enforcement officer under Indiana law.34
Notably, in both James and Sykes, Justice Scalia dissented, questioning the
constitutionality of the clause.35 But, Scalia’s dissents were absent in Begay and
Chambers. Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Sykes, noted that the Court’s opinion was
“an attempt to clarify, for the fourth time since 2007,” the residual clause and only
served to “produce[] a fourth ad hoc judgment that will sow further confusion.”36
Despite Justice Scalia’s quip that the Court tries “to include an ACCA residualclause case in about every second or third volume of the United States Reports,” he
was frustrated with the Court’s inability to craft and adhere to a single cognizable
test in their “tutti-frutti opinion.”37
By the time the residual clause graced the Court’s docket for the fifth time, the
frustration voiced by Justice Scalia had spread among the other Justices: “[f]our
times [was] enough.”38 In the lead up to Johnson, Justice Kennedy, who authored
Sykes over Justice Scalia’s dissent, expressed uncertainty about the clause.39
Similarly, Justice Bryer seemed discontent with the confusion his Begay opinion
generated among the lower courts.40 By the time Johnson was decided, the Court
had applied four different analyses to a single clause in less than a decade, resulting
in confusion and frustration.
31

553 U.S. 137, 140 (2008), abrogated by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551

(2015).
32

Id.
See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 130 (2009), abrogated by Johnson v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
34
See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 4 (2011), overruled by Johnson v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
35
See James, 550 U.S. at 229–30 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (opining that the statute
contained “shoddy draftsmanship” and the court could rightly “hold it void for vagueness”);
Sykes, 564 U.S. at 28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We should admit that ACCA’s residual
provision is a drafting failure and declare it void for vagueness.”).
36
Sykes, 564 U.S. at 28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37
Id. at 28, 30.
38
Id. at 28; see Rory Little, Re-Argument analysis: The votes are not there to sustain
the residual clause, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 22, 2015, 3:11 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2015/04/re-argument-analysis-the-votes-are-not-there-to-sustain-the-residual-clause/
[https://perma.cc/6PXU-GFSB].
39
Little, supra note 38.
40
Id.
33

2019]

VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE

243

On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court held in Johnson that the residual clause
of the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony” was unconstitutionally vague.41 The
opinion, written by Justice Scalia, was the last in the series through which the
Supreme Court struggled to establish a definitive interpretation and application of
the clause. The Johnson Court summarized the source of the constitutional
vagueness of the residual clause as follows:
[t]wo features of the residual clause conspire to make it
unconstitutionally vague. In the first place, the residual clause leaves grave
uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime. It ties the
judicial assessment of risk to a judicially imagined “ordinary case” of a
crime, not to real-world facts or statutory elements. How does one go
about deciding what kind of conduct the “ordinary case” of a crime
involves?
....
At the same time, the residual clause leaves uncertainty about how
much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.42
In short, the meaning of “violent felony” is more “unpredictabl[e] and
arbitrar[y] than the Due Process Clause tolerates” because of (1) the indeterminacy
of measuring the risk posed by a crime and (2) the uncertainty about the level of risk
necessary for a crime to qualify as a “violent felony.”43
To reach its conclusion in Johnson, the Court had to take some unusual
measures. First, it abjured an interpretive canon of judicial restraint, which dictates
the Court should avoid calling into question a law’s constitutionality where it could
otherwise be interpreted within the confines of constitutional limitations.44 Similarly
41

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015).
Id. at 2557–58.
43
CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RES. SERV., R41449, ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT (18
U.S.C. 924(e)): AN OVERVIEW 6 (2015); see also Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556 (“[T]he
Government violates [the Fifth Amendment] guarantee by taking away someone’s life,
liberty, or property under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair
notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.”).
44
Although the concurring opinion by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority is often used as the primary reference for the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance, the idea was one of the many offered by Chief Justice Marshall who played a
pivotal part in shaping the role of the court. See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding
Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1012 (1994) (describing Brandeis’s
concurrence as “the most significant formulation of the avoidance doctrine.”); Andrew
Nolan, CONG. RES. SERV., 7-5700, THE DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE: A
LEGAL OVERVIEW, 9, 9, n.84 (2014) (observing the portion on constitutional avoidance is
“the most famous and quoted aspect of the Ashwander concurrence” and noting that
“Brandeis’s Ashwander concurrence has been cited in 1,279 federal cases” as of 2014.); Ex
parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (“No questions can be brought before
a judicial tribunal of greater delicacy than those which involve the constitutionality of a
42
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unusual was the Court’s decision to overturn the piecemeal precedent it had formed
around the residual clause within just a few years of their prior decisions.45 Last, the
Court had to expose the vagueness doctrine as being broader than previously
understood by some, and potentially expose other statutes to “constitutional
doubt.”46
Despite the unusual measures necessary to reach the decision, a majority of the
Court felt justified under the circumstances. The Court had previously intimated to
Congress that the drafting was subpar and needed to be addressed.47 Indeed, before
Johnson, Congress’s legal advisors made note of the Court’s difficulty interpreting
the statute.48 After five cases and almost ten years of inaction by Congress, the Court
was indeed “tired of the [ACCA]” and “[a]nxious to rid [its] docket of bothersome
residual clause cases.”49 At the conclusion of the ordeal, the Court simply could not
use the residual clause’s guidance to craft a consistently applicable principle with
which to differentiate crimes posing a serious risk of injury from those that do not.50
So, rather than continuing to take on the residual clause’s ambiguity repeatedly on a
case-by-case basis, the Court foreclosed the discussion by ruling the clause
legislative act. If they become indispensably necessary to the case, the court must meet and
decide them; but if the case may be determined on other points, a just respect for the
legislature requires, that the obligation of its laws should not be unnecessarily and wantonly
assailed.”). It wasn’t for another one hundred years that the doctrine was articulated by
Justice Brandeis as a list of seven loosely related rules restraining the court from issuing
broad holdings on matters of constitutional law. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth.,
297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Over time, the Court has
reemphasized the importance of this fundamental doctrine. Although, the Court does not treat
the doctrine as paramount and has on a number of occasions hedged it in order to reach a
conclusion that a law is constitutionally invalid, as in the current case.
45
See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2573 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“So brushing aside stare
decisis, the Court holds that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague even though we
have twice rejected that very argument within the last eight years.”).
46
Id. at 2561 (majority opinion).
47
See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 35 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Congress
can quickly add what it wishes.”); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 230 (2011) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (“Congress has simply abdicated its responsibility when it passes a criminal
statute insusceptible of an interpretation that enables principled, predictable
application . . . .”); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 134 (2009) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“At this point, the only tenable, long-term solution is for Congress to formulate
a specific list of expressly defined crimes that are deemed to be worthy of ACCA’s
sentencing enhancement.”); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142–43 (2008)
(discussing the court’s division in determining the intent of Congress in regard to the residual
clause).
48
See LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RES. SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 12–13, 13 n.72 (2014).
49
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2573 (Alito, J., dissenting).
50
United States v. Snyder, 793 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Johnson, 135
S. Ct. at 2558).
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unconstitutionally vague.51 But the ruling was not without consequence. Just as some
feared, Johnson opened the door for litigants seeking to invalidate other clauses
bearing a seemingly similar degree of ambiguity.52
C. Johnson as a Vehicle to Challenge the Constitutionality of Other Statutes
Johnson had an immediate impact. Within weeks, the United States Sentencing
Commission determined that it would amend the Sentencing Guidelines, which used
language identical to that of the residual clause.53 Shortly thereafter, the federal
courts of appeals reached different conclusions on the retroactive applicability of
Johnson.54 In an ironic twist, within a year of Johnson, the residual clause was again
before the Supreme Court to resolve this circuit split. The Court then made
Johnson’s holding retroactive to cases on collateral review in Welch v. United
States.55 Welch temporarily opened the floodgates of litigation for review of
sentences enhanced under the ACCA’s residual clause. But, it also had the
unintended consequence of further fomenting litigation of other clauses bearing
some similarities to the ACCA’s residual clause.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, prisoners can seek review of their conviction if they
file a motion within one year of the date on which the right asserted is initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right is made retroactively applicable on
collateral review.56 Johnson recognized a new right which, having been made
retroactively applicable, enabled prisoners sentenced under the residual clause to
petition the court to reduce or vacate their sentences.57 However, because Welch was
decided several months after Johnson, prisoners had a little over two months to file
a habeas petition for collateral review of a sentence based on the right recognized by
Johnson. With little time for interpretation or application by the federal courts,
51

Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2560 (“Nine years’ experience trying to derive meaning from
the residual clause convinces us that we have embarked upon a failed enterprise.”).
52
Id. at 2577 (Alito, J., dissenting) (expressing concerns that the opinion was a “nuclear
explosion” and could invalidate “scores of federal and state laws”).
53
Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Seeks
Comment on Revisions to Definition of Crime of Violence (Aug. 7, 2015),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-news-advisories/pressreleases/20150807_Press_Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XW6-QXEA]. Oddly, this
reaction proved seemingly unnecessary as the Court subsequently ruled in Beckles v. United
States that the Sentencing Guidelines were not implicated by Johnson because the Guidelines
are advisory and thus not subject to a vagueness challenge. See Beckles v. United States, 137
S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017).
54
See Brian Toth, On Johnson Retroactivity, the Eleventh Circuit Splits with the
Seventh Circuit, SDFLA BLOG (Aug. 12, 2015), http://sdfla.blogspot.com/2015/08/onjohnson-retroactivity-eleventh.html [https://perma.cc/JPU2-WPFG].
55
136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016).
56
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (2012).
57
Id.; Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264 (“It is undisputed that Johnson announced a new rule.”).
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prisoners liberally invoked the Court’s decision and sought review of statutes
beyond the ACCA’s residual clause under broad readings of Johnson. Some courts
permitted these broad readings and others rejected the notion that Johnson supplied
the right necessary to challenge statutes beyond the residual clause.58 This confusion
among the district courts permeated to the federal courts of appeals, resulting in
another circuit split.59
Among the language to which petitioners tried to extend Johnson was the
definition of “crime of violence” articulated in the Sentencing Guidelines.60 After a
circuit split emerged, the Supreme Court took a Ninth Circuit case to resolve the
question.61 The case was the first to reach the Supreme Court that questioned the
extension of Johnson beyond the residual clause. In Beckles v. United States,62 the
Court upheld the Sentencing Guidelines’ definition for “crime of violence,” not
under some permissible application of the Johnson standard, but because the
Sentencing Guidelines are advisory and thus not vulnerable to a vagueness
challenge.63
Similar challenges were raised under Johnson against the INA,64 which
incorporated 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)’s definition of “crime of violence.” This was done
in order to contest crimes of violence qualifying as deportable offenses.65 This
application also led to a circuit split, and the question went before the Supreme Court
in Sessions v. Dimaya.66 Dimaya was the second case to address the extension of
58
See, e.g., United States v. Maldonado, 636 F. App’x 807, 810 (2d Cir. 2016)
(assuming the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Johnson applies to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)). But
see, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670, 679 (5th Cir. 2016), order
vacated on reh’g, No. 16-6259, 2018 WL 3013812 (U.S. June 18, 2018), and cert. granted,
judgment vacated, No. 16-6259, 2018 WL 3013812 (U.S. June 18, 2018) (determining that
Johnson did not extend to the INA’s § 16(b)).
59
See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
60
United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670, 674 (5th Cir. 2016), abrogated
by Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
61
Id. at 679; Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom.
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
62
137 S. Ct. 886 (2017).
63
Id. at 892.
64
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, H.R. 2580; Pub. L. 89–236, 79 Stat. 911,
(1965).
65
See Katherine Brady, Some Felonies Should No Longer Be “Crimes of Violence” for
Immigration Purposes, under Johnson v. United States, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR.
1 (2015) https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/ files/resources/johnson_v_us_ilrc_adv_8_2015_
pdf_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7MF-KLKD] (“Conviction of a state offense that meets the
definition of a crime of violence (COV) at 18 USC § 16 has two potential immigration
penalties. If committed against a victim with whom the defendant shared a protected
domestic relationship, a COV may be a deportable crime of domestic violence. If a sentence
of a year or more is imposed, a COV is an aggravated felony, regardless of the type of
victim.” (citations omitted)).
66
138 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2018).
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Johnson’s holding to statutes other than the residual clause. But the resolution of
Dimaya did not adjudicate the underlying question of whether Johnson and its newly
created right apply beyond the residual clause. Rather, the Court used the same
standards of vagueness articulated in Johnson to summarily find the statute
unconstitutional.67 The outcome of Dimaya holds particular relevance to the risk-offorce clause because the two statutes share identical language.68 However, the
Dimaya holding does not directly address the risk-of-force clause and its unique
factors.69
Not surprisingly, a similar split in opinion has also resulted as the appellate
courts have considered vagueness challenges to the risk-of-force clause in
§ 924(c)(3)(B). The statutory language has been challenged with mixed success
among some circuits and is still being considered in others.70 Given the related nature
of the argument to extend Johnson and the existing circuit split, it is likely the statute
will eventually be challenged before the Supreme Court.71 It is in this context that
this Note now turns to discuss § 924(c)(3)(B) and concludes that it is not
unconstitutionally vague under Johnson.
D. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in Perspective
Mandatory minimum sentence enhancements are present in two federal firearm
statutes: the ACCA and § 924(c).72 Section 924(c), as part of the Gun Control Act
of 1968, predates the ACCA.73 However, the sections defining a crime of violence
67

Id. at 1216.
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) (2012) (defining
a crime of violence, in part, as a crime “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that
physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.”).
69
Despite the identical language of the two provisions, several factors distinguish the
two provisions which would necessitate separate consideration. See infra Part II.A.
Additionally, the judgment on the unconstitutionality only facially prejudices a future
consideration of the risk-of-force clause under the reaffirmed rule for vagueness
determination. But given that there are distinguishing factors between the two statutes, the
Court may wish to revisit its void-for-vagueness doctrine in the near future to stem the tide
of new litigation, which has arisen as a (mostly) unforeseen consequence.
70
See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
71
It is worth noting that at least one circuit court has reversed its position on the riskof-force clause in a decision following Dimaya. See United States v. Salas, 889 F.3d 681,
683 (10th Cir. 2018). While others may similarly follow, it is unlikely that all will equate the
two statutory provisions. Rather some may join the unique position of the Sixth Circuit,
which is the only court to have found § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague, yet upheld §
924(c)(3)(B) as constitutional. See Shuti v Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 449–51 (6th Cir. 2016).
72
CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RES. SERV., R41412, FEDERAL MANDATORY MINIMUM
SENTENCING: THE 18 U.S.C. 924(C) TACK-ON IN CASES INVOLVING DRUGS OR VIOLENCE 1
(2015).
73
See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–618, 82 Stat. 1224 (1968).
68
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were not added until Congress passed the Firearm Owner’s Protection Act of 1986.74
While the ACCA addresses recidivists, as previously mentioned, § 924(c) mandates
additional periods of incarceration any time a firearm is used or possessed during
and in relation to a federal crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime.75 The statute
provides enhancements based on factors including the various types of firearms, the
manner of the firearm’s employment relative to the crime, and whether the charge
is a first-time offense or one among several violations.76 It has been subject to several
challenges before the Supreme Court77 since its inception and has been amended
various times.78 It has been upheld against several constitutional challenges,
including the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment;79 the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment;80 the

74

(1986).

Firearm Owner’s Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449, 457

75
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012); see also Michael J. Riordan, Using a Firearm
During and in Relation to a Drug Trafficking Crime: Defining the Elements of the Mandatory
Sentencing Provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), 30 DUQ. L. REV. 39, 40 (1991) (“The change
was primarily attributable to the bipartisan belief that rehabilitation of criminals was difficult
to accomplish and by widespread dissatisfaction with judicial discretion in sentencing, which
critics argued actually exacerbated the problems of controlling crime. This dissatisfaction
resulted in renewed support for mandatory minimum penalties, especially for crimes
involving narcotics offenses.” (citations omitted)).
76
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012).
77
DOYLE, supra note 72, at 12–21.
78
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1970); Pub. L. No. 91–644, § 13, 84 Stat. 1889 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1976)); Pub. L. No. 98–473, § 1005, 98 Stat. 2138 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1982)); Pub. L. No. 99–308, 100 Stat. 457 (1986); Pub.
L. No. 100–690, § 6460, 102 Stat. 4373 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988));
Pub. L. No. 101–647, § 1101, 104 Stat. 4829 (1990); Pub. L. No. 105–386, § 1, 112 Stat.
3469 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000)); Pub. L. No. 109–92, § 6(b), 119
Stat. 2102 (2005). One example is that the statute originally condemned the “use” of a
firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1970). But, the Supreme Court found the word “use” anticipates
more than possession. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995) (noting that § 924(c)
“requires evidence sufficient to show . . . a use that makes the firearm an operative
factor . . . . ‘[U]se’ must connote more than mere possession . . . .”). So, Congress amended
the language in 1998 to outlaw both use and possession “in furtherance” of a predicate
offense. Pub. L. No. 105–386 § 1, 112 Stat. 3469 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
(2000)).
79
See, e.g., United States v. Napolitan, 762 F.3d 297, 311 (3d Cir. 2014); United States
v. Bryant, 711 F.3d 364, 368–69 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Potter, 630 F.3d 1260, 1261
(9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Jackson, 555 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2009).
80
See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 793 F.3d 612, 633–34 (6th Cir. 2015), vacated,
136 S. Ct. 1157 (mem.), remanded in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551
(2015); United States v. Haile, 685 F.3d 1211, 1222 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Major,
676 F.3d 803, 812 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Thomas, 627 F.3d 146, 160 (5th Cir.
2010).
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right to trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment;81 the Fifth Amendment’s
proscriptions of double jeopardy and due process;82 the constitutional structure for
separation of powers;83 and congressional authority granted under the Commerce
Clause.84
Because a court may not circumvent the sentence enhancements called for by
§ 924(c) by ordering concurrent sentences,85 imposing a probationary sentence,86 nor
artificially reducing the sentence of the predicate offense,87 sentences under § 924(c)
are especially potent.88 In addition, a criminal series—which involves multiple acts
qualifying as predicate offenses—“trigger[s] enhanced mandatory minimum
penalties” and allows the court to impose enhanced sentences for multiple
violations.89 This makes prisoners all the more desperate to seek its invalidation.
81

See United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135
S. Ct. 2827 (2015); United States v. Hunter, 770 F.3d 740, 745–46 (8th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 2338 (2014).
82
See United States v. Catalan-Roman, 585 F.3d 453, 471–72 (1st Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 560 U.S. 948 (2010); United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 493–94 (4th Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 550 U.S. 956 (2007).
83
See United States v. Major, 676 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 280 (2012); United States v. Walker, 473 F.3d 71, 75–76 (3d Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
127 S. Ct. 1924 (2007).
84
See United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 815–16 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
562 U.S. 1236 (2011); United States v. Lynch, 367 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d,
437 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Miller, 283 F.3d 907, 913–14 (8th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 871 (2002).
85
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) (2012).
86
Id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(i).
87
E.g., United States v. Chavez, 549 F.3d 119, 135 (2d Cir. 2008) (confirming the
district court’s conclusion that it is “not permitted to reduce that prison term [for an
underlying offense] on account of the mandatory minimum sentence provided by §
924(c) . . . ”); United States v. Hatcher, 501 F.3d 931, 933–34 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
552 U.S. 1170 (2008) (holding that the sentence enhancement provided by § 924 must be
imposed independently of the sentence for the underlying crime); United States v. Franklin,
499 F.3d 578, 583 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[The] statutory language reflects the intent of Congress
that the § 924(c)(1) sentence must be imposed ‘in addition to’ a reasonable guideline range
sentence.”); United States v. Roberson, 474 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The district judge
was therefore required to determine the proper sentence for the bank robbery entirely
independently of the section 924(c)(1) add-on . . . .”); see S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 312–14
(1984) (“Section 924(c) sets out an offense distinct from the underlying felony and is not
simply a penalty provision.”).
88
See DOYLE, supra note 72, at 9.
89
Id. at 9, 9 n.76 (“[M]ultiple underlying offenses support multiple § 924(c)(1)
convictions” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Sandstrom, 594 F.3d 634, 658
(8th Cir. 2010)); see also United States v. Catalàn-Roman, 585 F.3d 453, 472 (1st Cir. 2009);
United States v. Penney, 576 F.3d 297, 316 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hen ‘two separate predicate
offenses for triggering § 924(c)(1) were charged and proven,’ a defendant may be convicted
and sentenced for two separate crimes, even if both offenses were committed in the course
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With an understanding of the fundamental purpose, history, and complications
of the clauses, this Note can proceed to juxtapose the residual clause with the riskof-force clause found in § 924(c)(3)(B). This is necessary because advocates of a
broad reading of Johnson enjoyed some level of success with statutes beyond the
residual clause. Given the previous success of cases argued under an expansive
reading of Johnson, this Note forecasts that the current circuit split concerning the
risk-of-force clause will inevitably come before the Supreme Court soon and turns
to discuss whether the risk-of-force clause is unconstitutionally vague in light of
Johnson.
II. ANALYSIS
“Importing a definition from a different statute, even with identical language,
has serious implications on the constitutionality of the Act.”90 Consequently, an
analysis of the risk-of-force clause should be independent of any assumption that it
bares any meaningful similarity to the residual clause with which it is often
associated, or even that of the identical language used in § 16(b).91 But, because the
cases which consider the constitutional vagueness of the risk-of-force clause do so
in light of Johnson and Dimaya—out of procedural necessity—rather than
independently, the analysis will proceed in kind. Therefore, the question becomes
whether the risk-of-force clause can be distinguished from the residual clause and
whether it is distinguishable from the INA statute. Additionally, this Note begins
with the presumption that all statutes are constitutional.92
of the same event.” (quoting United States v. Naboor, 901 F.2d 1351, 1357–58 (6th Cir.
1990))); United States v. Looney, 532 F.3d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 2008).
90
Raymond E. Gazer, The Presumption of Innocence: Why Should the Accused Care
Whether He Is Being Detained Before Trial for Regulatory or Punitive Reasons? Jail Is Still
Jail: Re-Examining the Judicial Gloss that Has Diluted the Bail Reform, 25 PACE L. REV.
355, 360 (2005).
91
Chief Justice Roberts notes his concern of an out-of-control void-for-vagueness
doctrine and the potential invalidation of other statutes in subsequent rulings. Session v.
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1241 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“In addition, § 16 serves
as the universal definition of ‘crime of violence’ for all of Title 18 of the United States Code.
Its language is incorporated into many procedural and substantive provisions of criminal law,
including provisions concerning racketeering, money laundering, domestic violence, using a
child to commit a violent crime, and distributing information about the making or use of
explosives. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 25(a)(1), 842(p)(2), 1952(a), 1956(c)(7)(B)(ii), 1959(a) (4),
2261(a), 3561(b). Of special concern, § 16 is replicated in the definition of ‘crime of
violence’ applicable to § 924(c), which prohibits using or carrying a firearm ‘during and in
relation to any crime of violence,’ or possessing a firearm ‘in furtherance of any such crime.’
§§ 924(c)(1)(A), (c)(3).”).
92
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883) (“Proper respect for a co-ordinate
branch of the government requires the courts of the United States to give effect to the
presumption that Congress will pass no act not within its constitutional power. This
presumption should prevail unless the lack of constitutional authority to pass an act in
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“The prohibition of vagueness in criminal statutes ‘is a well-recognized
requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules
of law,’ and a statute that flouts it ‘violates the first essential of due process.’”93 In
brief review, Johnson held that the residual clause of the ACCA was “so vague that
it fail[ed] to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so
standardless that it invite[d] arbitrary enforcement.”94 The Court found there was a
two-tiered problem, the clause left “grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk
posed by a crime,” as well as “how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a
violent felony.”95 It was the aggregate uncertainty—the combination of
unpredictability and arbitrariness—not just the formulaic uncertainties, that made
the residual clause unconstitutionally vague.96 Johnson does not invalidate all other
“risk clauses” for this reason.97
The extension of Johnson to the risk-of-force clause has been addressed by
various courts of appeals, the majority of which reject the argument and uphold the
statute as constitutional,98 at least prior to Dimaya.99 In doing so, the courts have
proposed a number of factors which distinguish the risk-of-force clause from the
question is clearly demonstrated.”). For an interesting discussion of the doctrine in its early
formation, see generally Note, The Presumption of Constitutionality, 31 COLUM. L. REV.
1136 (1931).
93
Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1068 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556–57 (2015)).
94
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556 (internal quotations omitted).
95
Id. at 2557–58; see Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1262 (2016) (observing
that the ACCA clause failed because it “required courts to assess the hypothetical risk posed
by an abstract generic version of the offense”).
96
See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558.
97
Id. at 2561, 2563 (concluding criminal laws using terms like “substantial risk,” “grave
risk,” and “unreasonable risk,” were not called into question).
98
See United States v. Eshetu, 863 F.3d 946, 955 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (making special
mention of the Supreme Court’s unanimous decisions in response to the language used in the
risk-of-force clause, but noting the Court’s division when the residual clause was at issue);
Ovalles v. United States, 861 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Johnson does not apply to
or invalidate § 924(c)(3)(B).”); United States v. Davis, 677 F. App’x 933, 936 (5th Cir. 2017)
(“Johnson does not invalidate § 924(c)(3)(B).”); United States v. Prickett, 839 F.3d 697, 699
(8th Cir. 2016) (holding that § 924(c)(3)(B) is considerably narrower than the ACCA’s
residual clause and much of Johnson’s analysis does not apply to it); Hill, 832 F.3d 135, 146
(2nd Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s explanation for its conclusion in [Johnson] renders
that case inapplicable to the risk-of-force clause.”); United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421,
424 n.1 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (rejecting vagueness challenge under plain error review);
United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 375–76 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding § 924(c)(3)(B) as
constitutional despite holdings by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits invalidating 18 U.S.C.
§ 16(b)). But see United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959, 996 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that
because a previous ruling found § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague and because the language
is identical, “the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is also unconstitutionally
vague”).
99
See supra note 71.
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residual clause. These factors are incorporated into the broader debate as
springboards for reasoned discussion. Factors largely emphasized in Dimaya, which
support an opposing conclusion, are also addressed to demonstrate why they are an
insufficient basis for concluding that the risk-of-force clause is unconstitutionally
vague. Each of the factors addressed below demonstrates how the risk-of-force
clause has less aggregate ambiguity than the residual clause—a key distinction given
the Court’s concern over the summation of the “grave uncertainty” involved in
determining whether an underlying crime qualified under the residual clause.100 The
distinguishing factors can be separated into two categories: textual differences and
contextual differences.
A. Textually Differentiating § 924(c)(3)(B)
The first source of distinction is found by comparing the text of the clauses.
The risk-of-force clause defines “crime of violence” as an offense that is a felony
and “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the
offense.”101 In contrast, the residual clause defines violent felony as a felony that
“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another.”102 The plain reading of the statutes provides three easily discernable
differences. These are: (1) a focus on conduct using physical force rather than the
resultant physical injury;103 (2) the inclusion of the phrase “by its nature” in only the
risk-of-force clause;104 and (3) a restriction unique to the risk-of-force clause. 105
The first textual factor which distinguishes the risk-of-force clause from the
residual clause is that “the statutory language of § 924(c)(3)(B) is distinctly
narrower, especially because it deals with physical force rather than physical
injury.”106 The difference between the two is that one concerns a result, while the
other concerns conduct.107 The statute concerned with the result of physical injury
encompasses more offenses because it includes conduct lacking a violent aspect, like
100

Session v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1240 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The
decision emphasized that it was the ‘sum’ of the ‘uncertainties’ in the ACCA residual clause,
confirmed by years of experience, that ‘convince[d]’ us the provision was beyond salvage.”
(citing Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2560)).
101
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) (2012).
102
Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
103
Infra notes 106–118 and accompanying text.
104
Infra notes 106–118 and accompanying text.
105
Infra notes 106–118 and accompanying text.
106
United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 376 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Serafin,
562 F.3d 1105, 1109 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding the risk of use of force is narrower than risk
of injury) overruled by United States v. Salas, 889 F.3d 681 (10th Cir. 2018).
107
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (“risk of physical injury to another”)
(emphasis added), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) (2012) (“risk that physical force . . . be
used”) (emphasis added).
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drunk driving.108 Accordingly, the statute concerned with the conduct using physical
force necessarily is limited to fewer offenses and therefore permits less ambiguity.109
This is especially true in light of the Court’s decision in Leocal v. Ashcroft,110 which
narrowed the definition of “use of physical force against another person” to
“suggest[] a category of violent, active crimes.”111 This qualification supports the
conclusion that the “[r]isk of physical force against a victim is much more definite
than risk of physical injury to a victim.”112 Logically speaking, it is far easier to
judge whether a crime is violent by how it is conducted than by the potential
consequences of the crime.113 Thus, judgments under the risk-of-force clause are less
likely to be imposed arbitrarily.
In Dimaya, the Court sidelines this distinction, citing a recent opinion holding
that “‘physical force’ means ‘force capable of causing physical pain or injury.’”114
There, the Court lost sight of the forest for the trees in trying to equate physical force
with resultant injury. In attempting to discount this important factor, the Court
overlooked the statute’s context. The requirement for physical force goes to the
intentional aspect of the action taken, not just the outcome of the action.115 The spirit
and intent of the statute are manifestly obvious when read as a whole. The statute
seeks to cover criminal conduct that purposefully or “actively” exercises physical
force, rather than conduct which incidentally results in harm.116 The interpretation
108

This was the question at issue in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
Ultimately, the Court decided driving under the influence is not a violent felony, despite the
fact that “[d]runk driving is an extremely dangerous crime,” which in the preceding year
“claimed the lives of more than 17,000 individuals and harmed untold amounts of property.”
Begay, 553 U.S. at 141–42 (citations omitted).
109
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
110
543 U.S. 1 (2004).
111
See id. at 11 (finding that under § 16(b) the “use of physical force against another
person . . . suggests a category of violent, active crimes”); see also United States v. Serafin,
562 F.3d 1105, 1114 (10th Cir. 2009) (applying Leocal to § 924(c) so that the analysis
focuses on whether the nature of the offense causes physical force to actually arise in the
course of the offense, rather than the possibility of it arising in the result).
112
United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 376–77 (6th Cir. 2016).
113
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1237 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
114
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1208 (majority opinion) (quoting Johnson v. United States,
559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010)).
115
See id. at 1236–37 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The difference is that [physical force]
asks about the risk that the offender himself will actively employ force against person or
property. That language does not sweep in all instances in which the offender's acts, or
another person’s reaction, might result in unintended or negligent harm.”).
116
Id. This is consistent with the requirement that courts read into a statute the scienter
necessary to separate wrongful conduct from innocent conduct. See Elonis v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (“We therefore generally ‘interpret [ ] criminal statutes to
include broadly applicable scienter requirements, even where the statute by its terms does
not contain them.’” (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70
(1994))).
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of physical force offered by the Court before it fully scrapped the residual clause in
disregard for much of the reasoning presented in Johnson117 hardly qualifies as
justification to treat a better-tailored statute as its equal.118
Second, the risk-of-force clause “also contains the ‘narrowing aspects’ of . . .
‘requiring that the felony be one which “by its nature” involves the risk that the
offender will use physical force.’”119 This differs from the residual clause’s
requirement that conduct merely “involve” a risk of injury. The phrase “by its
nature” is absent from the residual clause and must be given meaning.120 The phrase
indicates that a court should focus on the nature of the felony in question. Unlike the
residual clause, the risk-of-force clause does not permit “a court to consider riskrelated conduct beyond that which is an element of the predicate crime.”121 So, courts
have no need to look to a “judicially imagined ‘ordinary case’ of a crime” because
an offense is only a valid predicate if every conceivable conviction includes the risk
of the use of physical force.122 This is starkly different from the residual clause,
which required courts to look to an “ordinary case” under the categorical approach—
meaning that an offense would qualify if it ordinarily involves a risk of injury, even
if a particular commission might lack a violent element.123 “The mere fact that a
117

Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1240 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 1236 (“But the Court too readily dismisses the significant textual
distinctions between § 16(b) and the ACCA residual clause.”).
119
United States v. Prickett, 839 F.3d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States
v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 377 (6th Cir. 2016)); see also Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct.
2551, 2557 (2015) (holding that under the ACCA clause, a “court’s task goes beyond
deciding whether creation of risk is an element of the crime” because the question becomes
“whether the crime ‘involves conduct’ that presents too much risk of physical injury.”). But
see United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 722 (7th Cir. 2015) (opining that the phrases
“by its nature” and “involves conduct” are synonymous).
120
The rule to avoid surplusage indicates that each word or phrase has a meaning and
use in the broader text and any interpretation that renders the word or phrase meaningless
should be rejected. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995) (“[T]he Court will
avoid a reading which renders some words altogether redundant.” (citing United States v.
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955)); see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 833 (3d. ed.
2001).
121
Taylor, 814 F.3d at 377.
122
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2554; see United States v. Hart, 578 F.3d 674, 681 (7th Cir.
2009) (determining that federal escape could be committed without violent force and
therefore it was not, as a categorical matter, a crime of violence); see also Mathis v. United
States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2251 (2016) (“[A] state crime cannot qualify as an ACCA predicate
if its elements are broader than those of a listed generic offense.”).
123
The categorical approach is generally used to apply an enhancement provision and
“look[s] only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the predicate offense,
rather than to the particular underlying facts.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 576
(1990). Appellate courts are beginning to reject this approach when considering whether the
risk-of-force clause applies since a conviction under a § 924(c) offense is concurrently
118
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crime could be committed without a risk of physical harm does not exclude it from
the statute’s reach” because “the residual clause speaks of ‘potential risk[s],’ . . .
suggesting ‘that Congress intended to encompass possibilities even more contingent
or remote than a simple “risk,” much less a certainty.’”124
Such a commission—one lacking a substantial risk of the use of violent force—
is not possible under the risk-of-force clause. This is because the language indicates
that such a risk is inherent within the criminal elements required to secure a
conviction for the predicate offense, even if it is not facially present in the criminal
statute.125 This is a distinction the Court largely ignores in Dimaya,126 except for
Justice Gorsuch, who signaled in a concurring opinion his interest in exploring a
meaningful interpretation of the language.127

determined with the underlying offense. United States v. Kennedy, 720 F. App’x 104, 110
(3d Cir. 2017) (“[T]he rationales for applying the categorical approach were not present
when the predicate offense was tried contemporaneously before the same court.” (citing
United States v. Robinson, 844 F.3d 137, 142 (3rd Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1601
(2018))); United States v. Cravens, No. 16-8111, 2017 WL 6559798, at *8 (10th Cir. Dec.
19, 2017) (“It is time to re-think our use of the categorical approach in § 924(c) cases.”).
This further distinguishes the two statutes and their potential for arbitrary application by
eliminating the uncertainty inherit in post-conviction determinations of an offense’s violent
nature. But see Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1231 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
124
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2582 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting James v. United States,
550 U.S. 192, 207–208 (2007)).
125
It is worth noting that the risk-of-force clause is less expansive than the residual
clause in that it does not include offenses with potential risk, only those with substantial risk.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has defined physical force as “violent force - that is, force
capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Johnson v. United States, 559
U.S. 133, 140 (2010); accord United States v. Ventura-Perez, 666 F.3d 670, 674 (10th Cir.
2012) (“The Court construed physical force to require ‘violent force.’”). Indicating that an
offense with a substantial risk of physical force is seen as one which bears a strong likelihood
of employing violent force during its commission.
126
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1217 (2018).
127
See id. at 1233 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Plausibly, anyway, the word ‘nature’
might refer to an inevitable characteristic of the offense; one that would present itself
automatically, whenever the statute is violated. While I remain open to different arguments
about our precedent and the proper reading of language like this, I would address them in
another case, whether involving the INA or a different statute, where the parties have a
chance to be heard and we might benefit from their learning.” (citation omitted)).
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Furthermore, the risk-of-force clause applies “a qualitative risk standard to
‘real-world facts or statutory elements’” by requiring “an ultimate determination of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—by a jury, in the same proceeding.”128 This reduces
the ambiguity stemming from both modalities that undermined the residual clause,
as there is no longer grave uncertainty in estimating the risk posed by an ordinary
offense, nor about how much risk is needed to qualify.129
Third, the risk-of-force clause also contains the “‘narrowing aspect[]’ of
‘requiring that the risk of physical force arise “in the course of” committing the
offense.’”130 This prevents courts from considering factors “‘remote from the
criminal act,’ a consideration that supported the Court’s vagueness analysis in
Johnson.”131 It further fulfills the purpose of punishing those willing to put others at
risk of violence but differentiates between those who incidentally cause harm in the
course of their criminal conduct.132 This contrasts with “the wide judicial latitude
permitted by the ACCA’s coverage of crimes that involve conduct presenting a
serious risk of injury,”133 a determination which stands independent of the offender’s
intent and one which inexcusably permits a court to “evaluate the risk of injury
arising after the crime has been completed.”134
The Court in Dimaya half-heartedly dismissed this distinction as not
meaningful given the “ordinary case” approach, reasoning that the risk only occurs
during the commission anyway.135 Under traditional canons of interpretation, “all
words of a statute [are to] be given effect if possible . . . .”136 The Court seems to
deliberately misconstrue the language of the risk-of-force clause to make it seem as
though any conduct during the crime, from start to finish, should be considered in
determining an ordinary crime. An alternative view, encompassing the reality of the
128

Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 449 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at

2561).

129

While there may remain a certain degree of uncertainty in determining the
applicability of the clause, it is within the tolerable levels and beyond vagueness challenges.
The no-set-of-circumstances rule overlooked by the Johnson court holds that “a law is
facially invalid ‘only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.’”
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2581, 2581 n.2. (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494–95 (1982)).
130
United States v. Prickett, 839 F.3d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States
v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 376–77); see also Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2562 (emphasizing that the
ACCA required courts to review conduct that happened after the offense’s conclusion).
131
Prickett, 839 F.3d at 699 (internal quotations omitted).
132
See Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2284 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(opining that the “‘use of physical force’ connotes an intentional act” and recklessness is
insufficient to warrant an enhanced sentence).
133
Prickett, 839 F.3d at 699 (alterations incorporated) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
134
United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 377 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Johnson, 135 S.
Ct. at 2557).
135
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1208 (2018).
136
LARRY M. EIG, supra note 48.
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statute’s plain language, points to conduct inherent in that crime’s commission when
read as a whole.137 That is, the words “in the course of” should be understood to
mean “necessary for the commission of.”138 This interpretation lends to the
deliberateness with which violent force must be applied, rather than when violent
force might occur. Accidental or incidental harms were not the target of the risk-offorce clause, but could rightly be included in the residual clause.139 Because the riskof-force clause restricts qualifying offenses to those that generate the risk necessary
to its accomplishment, it again reduces the level of ambiguity and diminishes the
likelihood a court could arbitrarily apply the enhancement.
Each of the aforementioned factors is important, not only individually, but
collectively. If the risk-of-force clause were distinct in only one aspect, it might fail
to overcome the greater uncertainty which doomed the residual clause.140 As one
court later observed, “Johnson did not invalidate the ACCA residual clause because
the clause employed an ordinary case analysis, but rather because of a greater sum
of several uncertainties” which “may be tolerable in isolation.”141 The cumulative
effect of the textual differences lessens 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)’s aggregate
vagueness and uncertainty enough to make the statute constitutional.142 However,
the textual dissimilarities are not the sole source providing criteria by which to
distinguish between the two statutes.
B. Contextual Differences
Another way to distinguish the two statutes is by examining the contextual
differences under which the statutes exist. These are present in two forms; The first
difference concerns the holistic historic context of each statute. This is important to
consider given the unique circumstances under which the residual clause was
invalidated.143 The second is the contextual difference found in the framework of the
statutory body which shapes the meaning and application of a statute’s subsections.
137
See Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1237 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Properly interpreted,
this means the statute requires a substantial risk that the perpetrator will use force while
carrying out the crime.”) (emphasis added).
138
The House Subcommittee on Crime opined that the bill enacting 924(c) should be
altered because as it is written, proving the crime’s “element[s] would involve additional
analysis of the defendant’s conduct, the circumstances of the violent crime and evidence of
the defendant’s state of mind. It would be a substantial burden on the prosecution and is
unnecessary to prevent injustice.” See H.R. REP. No. 99-495, at 9 (1986). Thus, the
legislators understood this language to call for a fact specific inquiry into the offense rather
than an “ordinary case” analysis or a categorical approach.
139
See id. (“[Section] 16(b) . . . does not cover offenses where the danger arises from
the offender’s negligent or accidental conduct . . . .”).
140
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
141
United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 378 (6th Cir. 2016).
142
Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 450 (6th Cir. 2016).
143
See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557; Little, supra note 38.
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As explained below, this is accomplished by both qualifying statements and
restrictive applications.
A primary distinction in the historical context is that “§ 924(c)’s [risk-of-force]
clause has not been subject to the same kind of uncertainty in application that long
plagued the residual clause of the ACCA and ultimately led the Supreme Court to
strike that clause.”144 Johnson was exceptional. It was a product of the Court’s
frustration with Congress’s lack of response to the Court’s decade-long struggle to
define the clause,145 which caused the Court to cry, “no más.”146 As discussed above,
prior to Johnson, the Court interpreted the ACCA clause four times and applied four
different analyses to it within a five-year period.147 The Court was frustrated not only
with its own inability to define a workable standard, but with the ensuing confusion
it caused among federal judges who sought to follow the Court’s awkward and
shifting guidance, as well as the pressure placed upon defendants to plead guilty to
lesser offenses in order to avoid the uncertainty of incurring a sentence enhancement
should they risk fighting the charges.148 It was only after the Court’s failed efforts
that Justice Scalia reiterated that “the life of the law is experience” and concluded
that the Court’s poignant experience with the residual clause over a decade left only
“guesswork and intuition.”149 In contrast, the Court has not articulated varying
standards for the risk-of-force clause, nor has it been petitioned to resolve
ambiguities on multiple occasions within only a few years. As Justice Scalia
indicated, only experience can reveal a statute to be unconstitutionally unwieldy.150
144
In re Smith, 829 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2016) (noting “Johnson decline[d] to
expressly invalidate § 924(c)'s residual clause”); see also United States v. Breshers, No. 1040107-01-SAC, 2017 WL 2378349, at *4 (D. Kan. June 1, 2017) (finding consistency in the
application of the risk-of-force clause among the Third, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and Fifth
Circuits); United States v. Bowen, 228 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1209 (D. Colo. 2017) (noting the
differences of applicable standards for the ACCA and the risk-of-force clause); Lloyd v.
United States, No. CIV 16-0513 JB/WPL, 2016 WL 5387665, at *3 (D.N.M. Aug. 31, 2016)
(“The lower courts have noted no similar concerns [of vague or confusing application] with
§ 924(c)(3)(B).”).
145
See Little, supra note 38.
146
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1239 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
147
See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558–59; Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 4 (2011);
Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 130 (2009); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137,
139 (2008); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 195 (2007); see also supra notes 30–34
and accompanying text.
148
See Little, supra note 38. (“The problem with the [residual] clause has been that
many people—including federal judges and Justices—cannot agree as to what non-violent
offenses should ‘categorically’ fit this general definition. And as Chief Justice John Roberts
pointed out . . . uncertainty about the clause’s meaning . . . can pressure defendants to plead
guilty to lesser offenses rather than risk fifteen years in jail.”).
149
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2559–60.
150
See id. at 2562 (“Experience is all the more instructive when the decision in question
rejected a claim of unconstitutional vagueness. Unlike other judicial mistakes that need
correction, the error of having rejected a vagueness challenge manifests itself precisely in
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The Court simply has not had this experience with the risk-of-force clause. 151
The second contextual differences between the two statutes is found in the
framework of the statutory body in the form of a qualifying statement. The residual
clause is proceeded by an enumerated list of offenses.152 The clause states that a
violent felony is a felony that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.”153 This confusing attempt to establish an underlying link
between the listed offenses is one defect from which the residual clause suffers.
Justice Scalia emphasized this by writing in comparison, “[t]he phrase ‘shades of
red,’ standing alone, does not generate confusion or unpredictability; but the phrase
‘fire-engine red, light pink, maroon, navy blue, or colors that otherwise involve
shades of red’ assuredly does so.”154 But, a “required nexus to the enumerated
crimes . . . [is not] an infirmity from which” the risk-of-force clause suffers.155 The
list of enumerated crimes obscures the “degree of risk” required because the listed
offenses are an odd combination lacking a common class of risk.156 While a
“confusing list” of offenses was not dispositive for Johnson, it contributed to
“significantly less predictability” in the clause’s application and was an additional
factor lending to the residual clause’s grave uncertainty.157 The lack of an
inconsistent, enumerated list of offenses lends credibility to the risk-of-force
clause.158
subsequent judicial decisions: the inability of later opinions to impart the predictability that
the earlier opinion forecast. Here, the experience of the federal courts leaves no doubt about
the unavoidable uncertainty and arbitrariness of adjudication under the residual clause . . . .
[T]he provision remains . . . ‘a black hole of confusion and uncertainty’ . . . .” (internal
citations omitted)).
151
Arbitrary enforcement was also a fatal feature of the INA clause because the ACCA
standards were “regularly applied” despite differing statutory language. Golicov v. Lynch,
837 F.3d 1065, 1074 (10th Cir. 2016). In contrast, courts do not apply the ACCA standards
to the risk-of-force clause. See Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 449 (6th Cir. 2016) (2018).
152
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012).
153
Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
154
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561 (quoting James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 230 n.7
(2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
155
DOYLE, supra note 72, at 5.
156
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558.
157
Id. at 2561 (noting that other risk clauses are saved from scrutiny because they are
not linked to a “confusing list of examples”); United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135, 146 (2d
Cir. 2016) (“[T]he risk-of-force clause contains no mystifying list of offenses and no
indeterminate ‘otherwise’ phraseology—a defining feature of the ACCA's residual clause
that, in [Johnson], was understood to add an additional layer of uncertainty as to ‘how much
risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.’” (citation omitted)). But see Golicov
v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1074 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting the absence of enumerated crimes
was not one of the two determinative features used to invalidate the ACCA clause).
158
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1239 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The
enumerated offenses, and our Court's failed attempts to make sense of them, were essential
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Furthermore, the risk-of-force clause is distinguishable because of its restricted
application as designated by the statutory framework. The clause applies only when
an individual uses or carries a firearm “during and in relation to,” or possesses a
firearm “in furtherance of,” a “crime of violence.”159 This requisite nexus is not a
part of the broader residual clause found in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), but it is specific to
§ 924(c).160 The additional criterion ensures that predicate offenses include the risks
inherent when an offender employs a firearm during the commission of a crime.161
It therefore allows less indeterminacy about whether a predicate offense involves
risk-creation because firearms, when used for crime, inherently introduce a risk of
violence.162 The risk posed by the use of a firearm is in addition to the risk of the use
of physical force inherent in an underlying offense. This double layer of risk makes
it all the less likely that the courts could arbitrarily apply the clause.
Finally, § 924(c)(3)(B) “appl[ies] a qualitative risk standard to ‘real-world facts
or statutory elements’” by “requir[ing] an ultimate determination of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt—by a jury, in the same proceeding.”163 The retrospective
assessment of qualifying crime made necessary by the residual clause’s premise of
three previous convictions is not a deficiency from which the risk-of-force clause
suffers because the application of § 924(c)(3)(B) is concurrent with the trial for the
underlying crime.164 The Supreme Court has emphasized that “[t]he residual clause
failed not because it adopted a ‘serious potential risk’ standard but because applying
that standard under the categorical approach required courts to assess the
hypothetical risk posed by an abstract generic version of the offense.”165 Because
the application of the risk-of-force clause is concurrent, the categorical approach is

to Johnson’s conclusion that the residual clause ‘leaves uncertainty about how much risk it
takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.’” (citing Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 2558)).
159
18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1)(A) (2012).
160
Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(2)(B)(ii).
161
See supra note 138.
162
See generally United States v. Dillard, 214 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Firearms are
instruments designed for the use of violent physical force . . . Possession of a gun greatly
increases one’s ability to inflict harm on others and therefore involves
some risk of violence.”).
163
Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 449 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 2551, 2561); see id. (finding § 16(b) as unconstitutionally vague but affirming a
previous ruling that § 924 (c)(3)(b) is constitutional).
164
The residual risk clause looks to previous conduct: “In the case of a person who
violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 924
e(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
165
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1262 (2016); see United States v. Taylor,
814 F.3d 340, 378 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Johnson did not invalidate the ACCA residual clause
because the clause employed an ordinary case analysis, but rather because of a greater sum
of several uncertainties . . . [which] may be tolerable in isolation.”) (quoting Johnson, 135 S.
Ct. at 2560).
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unnecessary.166 The sentencing official has the exact facts of the case and underlying
conviction readily available and could eliminate a great deal of uncertainty by using
the “underlying-conduct approach.”167 This difference eliminates one level of
uncertainty at issue in Johnson and is sufficient to “uphold the constitutionality of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B).”168
After examining the potential extension of Johnson to the risk-of-force clause,
this Note concludes—as have a majority of the courts of appeals which have
considered the issue—that the statute is not so ambiguous or vague that it is
unconstitutional. The textual and contextual factors are sufficient to distinguish the
risk-of-force clause from the residual clause. And the apparent similarities are
insufficient to warrant extending Johnson or Dimaya to invalidate the clause because
the uncertainty that remains is within the range of what is tolerable. This conclusion
preserves Justice Scalia’s assurance that “we do not doubt the constitutionality of
laws that call for the application of a qualitative standard such as ‘substantial risk’
to real-world conduct”169 and stems the expanding tide of void-for-vagueness
doctrine.170
CONCLUSION
In sum, the risk-of-force clause is distinguishable from the residual clause. The
statute is textually narrower than the residual clause and encompasses less conduct
166

United States v. Cravens, 719 F. App’x 810, 818–19 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied,
No. 17-8796, 2018 WL 2118861 (2018) (“A number of district courts have also questioned
the use of the categorical approach in § 924(c) cases . . . It is time to re-think our use of the
categorical approach in § 924(c) cases. Easily determined facts are always preferable to rank
speculation . . . [W]hile the statutory language between the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA), which was the genesis of the categorical approach, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) may
be similar, the question of whether a crime is a crime of violence arises in significantly
different contexts under the two statutes.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States
v. Kennedy, 720 F. App’x 104, 110 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1601 (2018)
(“[T]he rationales for applying the categorical approach were not present when the predicate
offense was tried contemporaneously before the same court.” (citing United States v.
Robinson, 844 F.3d 137, 142 (3rd Cir. 2016))).
167
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1255 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(advocating the adoption of the underlying-conduct approach because the ordinary case
analysis is unworkable); Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2578–80 (Alito, J., dissenting) (inviting the
court to abandon the categorical approach in favor of a fact specific inquiry). But see Dimaya,
138 S. Ct. at 1217 (rejecting the underlying conduct approach and finding that the “Court
adopted the categorical approach in part to ‘avoid[ ] the Sixth Amendment concerns that
would arise from sentencing courts’ making findings of fact that properly belong to juries.’”
(quoting Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 267 (2013))).
168
Shuti, 828 F.3d at 450.
169
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561.
170
See Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1242 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I am also skeptical that
the vagueness doctrine can be justified as a way to prevent delegations of core legislative
power in this context.”).
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with more definitive standards for determining predicate offenses. It is qualified by
the statutory framework and additional requirements imposed by precedent. The
risk-of-force clause has been consistently applied, suffers from no confusing
interpretive applications, and addresses a specific and identifiable set of offenses.
Thus, it is not so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct
it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement. Simply put, the
risk-of-force clause does not contain the aggregate ambiguity necessary to warrant
invalidation. When it is considered by the Supreme Court, it should not be found to
be so vague that it is beyond what the Constitution tolerates.

